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ABSTRACT 
 
Modeling the performance of critical infrastructures and their interdependencies is an important 
task in the resilience assessment. In this paper, restoration curves for four critical lifelines 
(power, water, gas, telecommunication, and transportation) have been developed using a 
probabilistic approach. To do that, a large database on infrastructure downtime has been 
collected for most of the earthquakes that occurred in the past century. The restoration curves 
have been grouped based on the earthquake magnitude and the level of development of the 
country in which the earthquake occurred. The curves are presented in terms of probability of 
recovery and time; the longer is the time after the disaster, the higher is the probability of the 
infrastructure to recover its functions. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 Modeling the performance of critical infrastructures and their interdependencies is an important 
task in the resilience assessment. In this paper, restoration curves for four critical lifelines (power, 
water, gas, telecommunication, and transportation) have been developed using a probabilistic 
approach. To do that, a large database on infrastructure downtime has been collected for most of 
the earthquakes that occurred in the past century. The restoration curves have been grouped based 
on the earthquake magnitude and the level of development of the country in which the earthquake 
occurred. The curves are presented in terms of probability of recovery and time; the longer is the 
time after the disaster, the higher is the probability of the infrastructure to recover its functions. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The performance of infrastructures after earthquakes includes their capacity to absorb the shock 
and their willingness to bounce back to the initial state. While the structural damage following 
the disaster can be easily computed using fragility curves, the structural performance during the 
restoration phase is still at an early stage of research. After an earthquake, the functionality of 
damaged structures stops partially or totally until they are recovered. This period is known as the 
Downtime. The downtime is an essential parameter to estimate the resilience of a system. In 
engineering, resilience  is defined as “the ability of social units (e.g. organizations, communities) 
to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters when they occur, and carry out recovery 
activities in ways to minimize social disruption and mitigate the effects of further earthquakes" 
[1-3]. Several attempts have been made to evaluate the resilience of large systems using 
indicators and modeling approaches [4-9] but none of these approaches considered the downtime 
as a complex variable. 
 
Under the resilience context, downtime is the time span between the moment that the 
earthquake hits (t0=0), when the functionality Qi(t) drops to Qi(0), until the time when the 
functionality of the utility is completely restored [3]. Some of the factors that can influence the 
downtime are: the structural inspection, the assessment of damage, the finance planning, the 
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bidding  process, the repair effort, and the engineering consolation [10].One of the first attempts 
to evaluate the disruption time following an event was done by Basöz and Mander (1999) [11]. 
In their work, they developed downtime fragility curves for the transportation lifeline. The 
fragility curves were later integrated in the highway transportation lifeline module of HAZUS. 
Another downtime estimation methodology was developed based on a modified repair-time 
model [12]. This methodology estimates the downtime of only the rational structural components 
of a system due to the uncertainty involved in the process. In addition, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) has introduced the electronic tool PACT, which estimates the 
required repair time of buildings based on the damaged structural and non-structural components 
as well as on the building’s contents. PACT is considered the companion to FEMA P-58, a 
significant 10-year project funded by FEMA to develop a framework for performance-based 
seismic design and risk assessment of buildings [13]. Moreover, Almufti and Willford (2013) 
have suggested a modified downtime methodology based on the results coming from PACT. All 
details can be found in the REDi rating system report [14]. Also, a performance-based 
earthquake engineering method to estimate the downtime of infrastructures using fault trees has 
been introduced [15]. This method is applicable only when the downtime is mostly controlled by 
the non-structural systems damage. It also assumes that the restoration starts immediately after 
the event and the damaged components are repaired in parallel. 
 
Generally, the downtime of infrastructures varies according to several factors, such as the 
characteristics of the exposed structure, the earthquake intensity, and the resources to recover the 
damaged structure. Having so many factors makes the process of estimating the downtime even 
harder. Therefore, there is a need to have a simple and practical model for estimating the 
downtime of infrastructures. This work aims at developing an empirical probabilistic model for 
estimating the downtime of four lifelines (power, water, gas, telecommunication, and 
transportation) following an earthquake. First, a large database has been gathered from a wide 
range of literature [16; 17]. This database contains real information on a large number of 
earthquakes that took place in the last century as well as on the downtimes of the affected 
infrastructures. Fragility restoration functions were derived from the database using a 
probabilistic analysis. For each of the lifelines, a group of fragility curves were obtained in 
accordance with the earthquake magnitude and the level of development of the country in which 
the earthquake occurred. Those functions were presented in terms of probability of recovery and 
time. The longer is the time after the disaster, the higher is the probability of the infrastructure to 
recover its functions. 
 
Downtime Database of Lifelines 
 
Table 1 lists all the earthquakes considered in this work along with the year in which they 
occurred, the country they hit, and their intensity according to Richter scale of magnitude. A 
number of other damaging earthquakes that occurred during the same period have been collected 
but they were not included in this study because no engineering damage reports could be 
obtained for those events. Nevertheless, the events included in this study are sufficient to provide 
some useful illustrations for the recovery behavior of the examined lifelines. 
 
 
 
Table 1.     Summary of the analyzed earthquakes. 
 
Earthquake Year Country Magnitude Reference 
Loma Prieta 1989 USA 6.9 [18] 
Northridge  1994 USA 6.7 [19] 
Kobe  1995 Japan 6.9 [20] 
Niigata  2004 Japan 6.6 [21] 
Maule  2010 Chile 8.8 [22] 
Darfield  2010 New Zealand 7.1 [23] 
Christchurch  2011 New Zealand 6.3 [24] 
Napa  2014 USA 6 [25] 
Michoacán  1985 Mexico 8.1 [26] 
Off-Miyagi  1978 Japan 7.4 [27] 
San Fernando  1971 USA 6.6 [28] 
The Oregon Resilience Plan   2013 USA 9 [29] 
LA Shakeout Scenario 2011 USA 7.8 [30] 
Tohoku  2011 Japan 9 [31] 
Niigata  1964 Japan 7.6 [32] 
Illapel  2015 Chile 8.4 [33] 
Nisqually  2001 USA 6.8 [34] 
Kushiro-oki  1993 Japan 7.8 [35] 
Hokkaido Toho-oki  1994 Japan 8.2 [35] 
Sanriku  1994 Japan 7.5 [35] 
Alaska  1964 USA 9.2 [36] 
Luzon  1990 Philippines 7.8 [37] 
El Asnam  1980 Algeria 7.1 [38] 
Tokachi-oki  1968 Japan 8.3 [39] 
Valdivia  1960 Chile 9.5 [40] 
Nihonkai-chubu  1983 Japan 7.8 [41] 
Bam  2003 Iran 6.6 [42] 
Samara  2012 Costa Rica 7.6 [43] 
Arequipa  2001 Peru 8.4 [40] 
Izmir  1999 Turkey 7.4 [44] 
Chi-Chi  1999 Taiwan 7.6 [45] 
Alaska 2002 USA 7.9 [46] 
 
Table 2 lists the complete database used to create the restoration curves of each lifeline. 
The different earthquakes are listed in a random order. It is notable that each earthquake has 
caused damage to multiple infrastructures at the same time. For instance, in the city of Loma 
Prieta, the earthquake caused damage to two power plants, ten water systems, five gas stations, 
and six telecommunication systems. However, the affected infrastructures required different 
times to recover even when the infrastructures are of similar types. For example, the two power 
plants that were affected by the Loma Prieta earthquake needed different amount of time to 
recover: 2 and 0.5 days respectively. In addition, there were some cases where either the damage 
information was not available or no damage was recorded. Such cases are marked with a dash (-) 
inside the table. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.     The number of affected infrastructures and the corresponding downtimes. 
 
Earthquakes 
Lifelines affected 
Power Water Gas Telecom. 
No. DT (days) No. DT (days) No. DT (days) No. DT (days) 
Loma Prieta 2 (2), (0.5) 10 
(14), (4), (3), 
(1.5), (2), (1), (3), 
(3), (7),  (4) 
5 
(30), (16), 
(11), (10), 
(10) 
6 
(3), (4), (0.1), (3), 
(3), (1.5) 
Northridge  3 (3), (0.5), (2) 6 
(7), (2), (58), 
(12), (67), (46) 
4 
(7), (30), (5), 
(4) 
3 (1), (2), (4) 
Kobe  5 
(8), (3), (2), (5), 
(6) 
3 (0.5), (8), (73) 3 
(84), (11), 
(25) 
3 (1), (5), (7) 
Niigata  4 (11), (4), (1) 3 (14), (28), (35) 3 
(28), (35), 
(40) 
- - 
Maule  6 
(14), (1), (3) 
(10), (14) 
4 
(42), (4), (16), 
(6), 
2 (10), (90) 4 (17), (7), (3), (17) 
Darfield  3 (1), (2), (12) 2 (7), (1) 1 (1) 3 (9), (2), (3) 
Christchurch  3 (14), (0.16) 1 (3) 2 (14), (9) 2 (15), (9) 
Napa  1 (2) 6 
(20), (0.9), 
(0.75), (2,5), 
(12), (11) 
1 (1) - - 
Michoacán  4 
(4), (10), (3), 
(7) 
4 
(30), (14), (40), 
(45) 
- - 1 (160) 
Off-Miyagi  2 (2), (1) 1 (12) 3 (27), (3), (18) 1 (8) 
San Fernando  1 (1) - - 2 (10), (9) 1 (90) 
The Oregon Resil. 
Plan   
1 (135) 1 (14) 1 (30) 1 (30) 
LA Shakeout 
Scenario 
1 (3) 1 (13) 1 (60) - - 
Tohoku Japan  7 
(45, (3), (8), (2), 
(2), (4) 
8 
(4.7), (47), (1), 
(26), (7), (1), 
(47), (47) 
6 
(54), (2), (30), 
(3.5), (13), 
(18) 
3 (49), (21), (49) 
Niigata  2 (24) 3 (15), (4), (10) 2 (180), (2) - - 
Illapel  1 (3) 1 (3) - - - - 
Nisqually  3 (2), (6), (3) - 
 
- - - - 
Kushiro-oki  1 
(1) 
 
3 (6), (3), (5) 2 (22), (3) - - 
Hokkaido Toho-oki  1 (1) 3 (9), (3), (5) - - - - 
Sanriku  1 (1) 3 (14), (12), (5) - - - - 
Alaska  3 (2), (0.75), (1) 5 
(14), (5), (1), (7), 
(14) 
3 
(1), (5), (2), 
(14) 
2 (1), (21) 
Luzon  3 (7), (20), (3) 3 (14), (14), (10) - - 3 (5), (10), (0.4) 
El Asnam  - - 1 (14) - - - - 
Tokachi-oki  1 (2) - - 2 (30), (20) - - 
Kanto  2 (7), (5) 1 (42) 2 (180), (60) 1 (13) 
Valdivia  1 (5) 1 (50) - - - - 
Nihonkai-chubu  1 (1) 1 (30) 1 (30) - - 
Bam  1 (4) 3 (14), (10) - - 1 (1) 
Samara  1 (1) 1 (2) - - 1 (1) 
Arequipa  1 (1) 3 (32), (34) - - - - 
Izmit  1 (10) 2 (50), (29) 1 (1) 1 (10) 
Chi-Chi  3 (40), (14), (19) 1 (9) 1 (14) 1 (10) 
Alaska 2002 2 (2), (0.5) 10 
(14), (4), (3), 
(1.5), (2), (1), (3), 
(3), (7), (4) 
1 
(3) 
 
6 
(3), (4), (0.1), (3), 
(3), (1.5) 
* No = the number of affected infrastructures; DT = the downtime in days. 
 
Methodology 
 
The main challenge faced in this work is to illustrate the gathered data in the form of restoration 
curves. Typically, the procedure followed for constructing restoration curves is similar to that of 
fragility curves. The restoration process is one of the most uncertain variables in the resilience 
analysis; therefore, it is necessary to approach it in probabilistic terms. This is done by 
performing a statistical analysis to the raw data, trying to fit it to a statistical distribution. 
Nevertheless, choosing the right distribution can be a hard task due to the high number of 
distributions that exist in the literature. The gamma distribution was found to be the optimal fit to 
most of the database; hence, it is used to build the restoration curves. The probability distribution 
(PDF) of the gamma distribution is given by: 
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where Г(.)denotes the gamma distribution, α is the shape parameter, which allows the 
gamma distribution to take variety of shapes, β is the scale parameter whose effect is to stretch 
(greater than one) or squeeze the distribution (less than one). It is important to note that the 
exponential distribution is a special case of the gamma distribution function when the shape 
parameter α is set equal to 1. To obtain the values of α and β, it is first necessary to compute the 
mean and the standard deviation µD and σD. The mean value µD denotes the average value of a 
database consisting of n entries, and it is defined by: 
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while the standard deviation σD is the dispersion of a random variable of the database 
with respect to the mean value. The value of the standard deviation is obtained using the 
following formula: 
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After obtaining both µD and σD, the parameters α and β can be estimated using Eq. 4, 5. 
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It is important to note that the restoration curves developed for different damage states 
within the same sample should not intersect in order to describe meaningful results. Intersection 
of restoration curves may occur when the restoration curves are fitted independently of one 
another [47]. So, in order to avoid the intersection of the restoration curves corresponding to 
different damage states, the same standard deviation has been assumed [48;49]. 
 
Restoration Curves 
 
Restoration curves were developed for the power, water, gas, and telecommunications systems 
using the collected data. The curves are plotted based on the number of days required to restore 
full service to customers that lost service immediately after the earthquake (horizontal axis), and 
the likelihood that the utility will be completely restored to the customers (vertical axis). To 
provide a better understanding of the restoration process, the collected data has been divided 
based on two categories: 
 
Category I: Earthquake Magnitude 
 
Figure 1 shows the restoration curves of the four lifelines based on the earthquake magnitude. 
The intensity of the earthquake is a key parameter in defining the downtime, and this is shown in 
Figure 1 where the lifeline restoration rate follows the earthquake magnitude. 
 
The restoration curves of the lifelines are characterized by a similar behavior. The only 
difference lies in the restoration rate. The power system seems to have the shorter downtime as 
the curves reach the probability of 100% just 60 days after the event, unlike the other 
infrastructures, which needed at least 100 days to achieve a restoration probability of 100%. This 
outcome is expected because all lifelines need power to function, and thus the power system is 
always the first to recover. The telecommunication system, on the other hand, is heavily 
dependent on the power network, and this delays its restoration until the power system is 
recovered. This behavior is shown in Figure 1 where the restoration probability of the 
telecommunication system did not reach 100% even after 100 days. Lastly, the gas and the water 
systems are almost identical where both reach a restoration probability of 100% after 100 days. 
 
Category II: First world countries vs developing countries 
 
Figure 2 shows the restoration curves of the database grouped according to the level of 
development of the countries. From the figure, it is clear that the infrastructure restoration rate in 
the developing countries is lower than in the developed countries for all four lifelines. Moreover, 
the recovery rate of the power system for both groups of countries is the highest compared to that 
of other lifelines, usually because the functionality of the different lifelines is greatly dependent 
on the power lifeline. 
 
Figure 1.    Restoration curves of the lifelines based on the earthquake magnitude. 
 
 
Figure 2.    Restoration curves of the lifelines based on the level of development of the countries. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Downtime estimation is one of the most ambiguous aspects in the resilience engineering. 
Estimating the resilience of infrastructure due to earthquakes has been studied in the past; 
however, none of the studies highlighted a clear procedure to estimate the disruption time of 
damaged systems. This paper provides an empirical model for estimating the downtime of 
damaged infrastructures following earthquakes. This model used a large set of database for 
earthquake events that occurred over the last few decades. Four main lifelines were considered in 
this work (power, water, gas, and telecommunication). For each of them, a group of restoration 
curves have been derived. The restoration curves were presented in terms of the number of days 
required to restore full service to customers (horizontal axis), and the likelihood that the utility 
will be completely restored to the customers (vertical axis). 
 
With the absence of such models in the literature, this work will provide a useful tool that 
can be used by decision makers to estimate the downtime of infrastructures. It will also allow 
them to evaluate the infrastructures resilience because the downtime is a key parameter in the 
resilience assessment. Future work will be oriented towards extending the database to include 
more earthquakes. In addition, special attention will be given to the infrastructure 
interdependency to improve the accuracy of the restoration curves. Other lifelines, such as the 
transportation system, will also be analyzed once satisfactory data of a considerable amount of 
earthquakes is collected. 
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